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I am lucky to have two such penetrating commentators as Robert Kirk and 
Andrew Melnyk. It is also fortunate that they come at me from different directions, 
and so cover different aspects of my book. Robert Kirk has doubts about the 
overall structure of my enterprise, and in particular about my central commitment 
to a distinctive species of phenomenal concepts. Andrew Melnyk, by contrast, 
offers no objections to my general brand of materialism. Instead he focuses 
specifically on my discussion of the anti-materialist 'intuition of distinctness', 
raising questions about my attempt to explain this intuition away, and offering 
alternative suggestions of his own. 
Let me first discuss Robert Kirk's comments. This will enable me to clarify some 
of the central themes of the book. After that, I shall turn to Andrew Melnyk's 
helpful comments on the intuition of distinctness. 
Kirk's Comments 
Kirk is unhappy with the 'inflationist materialism' that underpins the overall 
argument of my book. An 'inflationist' thinks that there are special ways of 
thinking about conscious states—using phenomenal concepts—which are a priori 
distinct from all other ways of thinking about conscious states, and in particular 
from functionalist ways of thinking about conscious states. Because of this, 
inflationist materialists will deny that materialism requires all true claims to follow 
a priori from the physical truths (that is, they will reject the 'a priori 
characterization of materialism'). Of course, inflationist materialists will allow that 
some kinds of non-physical claims follow a priori from the physical truths. Insofar 
as we refer to water using an everyday concept that invokes the causal role of 
water, then we can arguably deduce all true claims about water from a complete 
inventory of physical truths, for these truths will tell us that H2O is the physical 
stuff that plays the watery role. But if phenomenal concepts don't invoke any 
causal roles, then there will be no such analogous a priori deduction of 
phenomenal claims from physical truths. ('Inflationist materialism' is another 
name for David Chalmers' 'Type-B materialism' (Chalmers, 2002). I would say 
that this position is now the standard view among materialist philosophers of 
mind. (Cf. Horgan, 1984, Peacocke, 1989, Loar 1990, Papineau, 1993, Sturgeon, 
1994, Hill, 1997, Hill and McLaughlin, 1998, Tye, 1999.)) 
In the last section of his comments Kirk defends the 'a priori characterization of 
materialism' against inflationist materialism. As a materialist, he then has to deny 
any a priori divide between our concepts of conscious states and our grasp of 
their functional roles. I shall say something about Kirk's views about our concepts 
of conscious states in a moment. But first I would like to point out that the 'a 
priori characterization of materialism' makes extremely strong demands in 
general, even outside the realm of the mind-brain relation. 
Take claims made using proper names—Tully had brown hair, say. Let us suppose 
that the totality of physical truths does indeed tell us about the hair colour of all 
the humans who ever existed. Still, will it tell us which of those human beings is 
Tully? In order for this to be deducible a priori from the physical truths, our grasp 
of the name 'Tully' will have to carry with it enough a priori information for us to 
single out Tully from all other humans. I see no reason to suppose that our 
competence with the name 'Tully' ensures this. After all, it is a commonplace of 
modern philosophy of language that our ability to use 'Tully' referentially depends 
inter alia on our causal-historical links to Tully, rather than on any uniquely 
identifying a priori description. (And the same goes for many other referring 
terms, apart from proper names of people.) 
I take this point to discredit the a priori characterization of materialism. It is 
clearly no argument against materialism that Tully had brown hair cannot be 
deduced a priori from physical truths. The barrier is not that Tully had brown hair
commits us to something non-physical. It is just that we can understand 'Tully' 
without knowing how to pick out Tully from all the purely physically specified 
people. 
Similarly, I say, with phenomenal terms. We cannot deduce that phenomenal 
pain is nociceptive-specific neuronal activity, say, a priori from the physical truths. 
But this isn't because 'phenomenal pain' refers to something non-physical. It's 
just that we can have the concept of phenomenal pain without knowing how to 
pick out its referent from among all the purely physically specified states. 
This is why I think zombie worlds are conceivable but not possible. Since there is 
no a priori route from the physical truths to phenomenal pain, we will not violate 
any conceptual constraints if we posit a being that shares all our physical 
properties but not our phenomenal pains. Yet, for all that, if phenomenal pains 
are material states, then such a being will not be possible, by the necessity of 
identity. [1]
Let me now turn to Kirk's suggestions about our concepts of conscious states. 
Since Kirk is a materialist who upholds the a priori characterization of materialism, 
he must maintain that these concepts will allow us to deduce the phenomenal 
facts a priori from the physical facts. Given this, he faces a prima facie difficulty 
with Frank Jackson's famous 'Mary' thought-experiment, since at first sight the 
post-exposure Mary would seem to acquire phenomenal concepts that can't be 
linked a priori with the physical facts. So somehow Kirk must resist taking the 
Mary story at face value. (Here Kirk is in the same boat as the contemporary 
Frank Jackson. Since formulating the 'knowledge argument', Jackson has become 
persuaded that materialism must be true (Jackson, forthcoming). However, his 
original knowledge argument successfully demonstrates that materialism is 
inconsistent with the two claims (a) that Mary shows that our phenomenal 
concepts are a priori detached from the physical facts, and (b) that materialism 
requires phenomenal claims to follow a priori from the physical truths. So Jackson 
has been forced to give up (a) or (b). Somewhat surprisingly, he has stuck to (b), 
and given up (a). That is, he has kept faith with the a priori characterization of 
materialism, but now denies that the Mary story shows that phenomenal concepts 
are a priori detached the physical facts. If you ask me, he has kept the bad bit of 
the knowledge argument, and thrown away the good bit. The Mary story is a 
terrific demonstration of distinct phenomenal concepts. By contrast, the a priori 
characterization of materialism strikes me as quite misguided.) 
It is not entirely clear from Kirk's comments how he himself would deal with the 
Mary thought-experiment. He is happy to allow that there is a sense in which 
Mary acquires new phenomenal concepts of her new experiences when she comes 
out of her grey prison. But he denies that these new concepts are entirely distinct 
from the old functional concepts that she could previously have used to refer to 
those experiences. Even if phenomenal concepts 'are not be linked in any obvious 
or direct way with . . . functional concepts, they may still be linked in indirect, 
unobvious ways'. Again, Kirk allows that we may 'have two very different ways of 
using our concept of pain. . . But that does not seem enough to justify the claim 
that there are two concepts.' 
However, I do not see how these claims can be reconciled with a variant of the 
Mary thought-experiment that I discuss in my book. This is the case where Mary 
is shown a coloured piece of paper when she emerges from her grey prison, but 
isn't told what colour it is. Now she has a new concept ('that kind of experience'), 
but this concept surely has no links, however indirect and unobvious, with any 
functional concepts. Mary can think about the type of experience in question, but 
no amount of a priori reflection is going to enable her to figure out its 
characteristic causes or effects. By the same coin, she will surely have no way of 
inferring the satisfaction of her new phenomenal concept a priori from the totality 
of physical truths. 
Let me respond to one final aspect of Kirk's comments. He feels that, if 
phenomenal-material identities were brute—not deducible a priori from the 
physical facts—then they would be mysterious. In the book, I claim that brute 
phenomenal-material identities are no more mysterious than brute proper names 
identities like Cicero = Tully. Kirk objects that 'the conditions for giving a man a 
name are easily understood and easily satisfied, while that is not so for the case 
of applying phenomenal concepts to physical properties'. Now, I concede 
phenomenal concepts may not be so 'easily understood' as proper names. But 
Thinking about Consciousness is a sustained attempt to remedy this, by 
elaborating a detailed account of how phenomenal concepts work, and in 
particular of how they can have physical referents, even though they are not 
associated a priori with any functional roles. This account is no doubt flawed in 
particular respects, but I see no reason in principle to rule out some such 
explanation of how phenomenal concepts apply to physical properties. 
Melnyk's Comments 
In the book I do agree that there is something intuitively mysterious about mind-
brain identities. But I deny that this feeling of mystery derives from the non-role 
nature of phenomenal concepts and our consequent inability to deduce the 
phenomenal facts a priori from the physical facts. Many contemporary 
philosophers refer to the absence of such a priori brain-mind deductions as 'the 
explanatory gap' (Levine, 1983). As an inflationist materialist, I of course accept 
that there is such an 'explanatory gap'—there are indeed no a priori brain-mind 
deductions. However I don't think that this 'explanatory gap' is why we find the 
relationship of mind to brain so puzzling. 'Explanatory gaps' of this kind are two-
a-penny, arising with the many other referring terms, such as ordinary proper 
names, which don't pick out their referents via roles. The feeling of mystery we 
feel in the mind-brain case is something else again—it is a real 'intuitive gap' 
rather than the commonplace and unpuzzling 'explanatory gap'. To understand 
the source of this intuitive gap we need to look elsewhere. 
Andrew Melnyk's comments focus on my analysis of this intuitive gap. He starts 
by noting that my central claim about a widespread 'intuition of (mind-brain) 
distinctness' is allied with the stronger thesis that this intuition of distinctness 
isn't just a nagging doubt, but actually stops any of us 'really believing' 
materialism. Moreover, as he notes, I do little to defend, or indeed clarify, this 
stronger claim in the book. Let me try to do a bit better here. 
To get a hold on the issue, let me explain why I want to claim that none of us—
including dyed-in-the-wool materialists like myself— really believes materialism. I 
need this claim in order to explain why even paid-up materialists continue to 
react to mind-brain identities in ways which according to my analysis commit 
them to dualism. To be specific, I need the claim to explain why even paid-up 
materialists continue to feel that zombies are prima facie possible; and I need it 
to explain why paid-up materialists continue to share the widespread feeling that 
there is something mysterious about mind-brain identities. In the book I argue in 
detail that neither of these reactions is explicable by the commonplace 
'explanatory gap'—that is, by reference to the a priori separation of phenomenal 
concepts from functional and other material concepts. For we have the same a 
priori separation in other cases, such as proper name identities, yet people who 
come to accept such identities don't continue to regard them as mysterious, or 
their falsity as apparently possible (rather, they come to think: Cicero couldn't fail 
to be Tully—after all, they're the same person). So I offer an alternative 
explanation for these persistent reactions in the mind-brain case: we have these 
persistent reactions because we don't really believe that phenomenal states are 
brain states to start with—and then, of course, we do find their relation 
mysterious ('Why ever should brain states be accompanied by phenomenal 
states?'), and do think that brain states without phenomenal states are possible 
(simply because we think they are distinct properties, even if correlated in the 
actual world). 
This now puts the question of disbelieving mind-brain identities into better focus. 
I need to attribute such disbelief to people to just the extent that they manifest 
the dualist reactions to mind-brain identities. In the book I simply assumed that 
even professed materialists will continue to have these dualist reactions, and 
inferred from this that they must really disbelieve materialism, despite any 
avowals to the contrary. But, now Andrew Melnyk has raised the issue, I see that 
there is room for a more nuanced treatment. 
Perhaps different professed materialists continue to have the dualist reactions to 
different degrees. While some might continue to feel them fully, others might 
only feel them to a lesser degree ('Zombies don't strike me as so obviously 
possible any more'), and yet others might lose the reactions almost entirely. 
Correspondingly, alongside those professed materialists who don't actually 
believe materialism, there may also be those who give materialism some non-
trivial degree of belief, and also those who give materialism pretty much full 
credence (for whom dualism is indeed just a 'nagging doubt'). 
Again, there could be complexities in the mode in which dualism is believed, 
rather than the degree. It is not always straightforward whether someone 
believes some proposition. You can fully believe something at a theoretical level, 
yet disbelieve it at some more primitive level. Consider people who cross their 
fingers when the aeroplane is taking off, or people who are 'in denial' about 
something for which they have overwhelming evidence, or indeed people who 
undergo the Müller-Lyer illusion. In all these cases, there is a sense in which they 
both believe and disbelieve something. Maybe this is how it is with many 
professed materialists. They believe materialism at a theoretical level, but at 
some more primitive level they remain in the grip of dualism. Their primitive 
disbelief will then offer an explanation of their continued dualist reactions. To the 
extent that their thinking is influenced by their primitive disbelief in materialism, 
zombies will continue to strike them as possible, and the mind-brain relation will 
continue to seem mysterious. 
Let me now turn from the issue of how far all of us believe dualism to the 
question of why we do so. In the book I offer 'the antipathetic fallacy' as my 
explanation. Melnyk raises some doubts about this explanation, and offers some 
alternative suggestions of his own. But before considering his points, it will help 
to make a methodological observation. When I first aired my 'antipathetic' 
diagnosis to colleagues in London in the early 1990s, my friend Scott Sturgeon 
said 'That's an interesting sociological hypothesis'. I was somewhat taken aback
at this apparently belittling reaction to some years of hard philosophical work, but 
I quickly realized Scott was quite right. Claims about the source of dualist 
thoughts are clearly empirical claims, answering to facts about the cognitive 
processes of the individuals covered by the claims. This means that we need not 
regard such claims as a yes-or-no matter. One explanation for dualist thoughts 
may apply to some individuals, another to different individuals. I shall not dwell 
on this point in what follows, but readers will do well to bear it in mind. (This fits 
with the point made a moment ago, that the whether everybody believes dualism 
isn't a yes-or-no matter either, even before we start asking why . Just as 
different people may believe dualism to different degrees, and in different modes, 
so also may they believe if for different reasons.) 
Melnyk wonders whether my 'antipathetic fallacy' is the right explanation for our 
intuitive inclinations towards dualism (the 'intuition of distinctness' henceforth). 
On my hypothesis, the fact that material concepts do not use phenomenal 
properties confuses people into thinking that material concepts do not mention
them either. Of course, most referring concepts don't use the items they mention, 
but my idea, as Melnyk explains, is that it is specifically the comparison with 
phenomenal concepts, which do use the phenomenal states they refer to, that 
confuses people here. 
Melnyk observes that my story requires some pretty sophisticated mental 
capacities. I need to suppose that, when people refer to some phenomenal state 
with some phenomenal concept, they can simultaneously think about their 
deployment of that phenomenal concept, and note that it involves that same 
phenomenal state. I agree that this is a pretty sophisticated ability, but not 
necessarily one that is beyond ordinary people (as Melnyk himself allows). Think 
what happens when people are invited to reflect on whether 'This technicolour 
phenomenology be produced by soggy grey matter'. They introspect or imagine
seeing colours on the left hand side, and then note that the phenomenology of 
these acts is absent when they think of soggy grey matter on the right hand side. 
Moreover, it is worth remembering that my story doesn't require ordinary people 
to keep a very clear grip on what is going on in such cases—on the contrary, I 
suppose that, once they have vaguely noted that material concepts 'leave out' the 
feelings associated with phenomenal concepts, they then proceed to get caught 
up in a fallacious use-mention muddle. 
Melnyk has a more definite worry about the antipathetic fallacy. Suppose ordinary 
people do note that their deployment of phenomenal concepts involves being in 
the phenomenal state referred to. Why ever should they conclude on this basis, 
via some sort of one-shot induction, that all concepts that refer to phenomenal 
states must so involve being in those states? Well, I agree that it is implausible 
that ordinary people should make such an induction. But that is not my 
hypothesis. To grasp clearly that phenomenal concepts use the selfsame 
phenomenal states that they mention, and to infer from this that all concepts that 
refer to phenomenal states must do the same, would be a rash induction, but at 
least it would be cogent. The reasoning I attribute to ordinary people is not rash, 
but muddled. They somehow note that non-phenomenal concepts 'leave out' the 
phenomenal states that phenomenal concepts 'involve', and fallaciously infer from 
this that non-phenomenal concepts don't refer to phenomenal states. If they 
could see clearly that the 'involvement' of phenomenal states in phenomenal 
concepts is a matter of the concepts simultaneously both using and mentioning 
the states, as Melnyk's inductive reconstruction of the antipathetic fallacy has it, 
then they would already be articulating things in a way that would enable them to 
avoid the confusion I attribute to them. 
Perhaps Melnyk would want to pursue this line of objection. Let us agree that the 
antipathetic fallacy involves a kind of use-mention confusion, rather than a rash 
induction. Still, why should this confusion arise only with concepts that refer to 
phenomenal states, and not with other kinds of concepts? But here there is a 
ready answer. We can think phenomenally about the deployment of any concept. 
But only in the case of phenomenal concepts will this phenomenal introspection 
inevitably mean we are also thinking about something phenomenally similar to 
the referent of the concept. For only phenomenal concepts refer by 
simultaneously activating some phenomenal state that is like their referent. So 
phenomenal concepts are indeed peculiar, in introspectively appearing to 'involve' 
their referents in a way that makes other ways of referring to those referents 
seem pale by comparison. 
I want now to take up Melnyk's alternative positive suggestion about the source 
of the intuition of distinctness. This is that phenomenal and material concepts 
may be so cognitively differently that it is impossible for us to 'merge files' in the 
way we generally do when embracing an identity claim. In the book I briefly 
consider this suggestion, only to dismiss it on the grounds that phenomenal 
concepts are closely related to perceptual concepts, yet no such cognitive barrier 
seems to block file-merging across the perceptual-theoretical divide. Melnyk 
raises two doubts about this line of argument. First, he suggests I may be wrong 
to hold that there is no cognitive barrier to file-merging across the perceptual-
theoretical divide. Second, and independently, he suggests that differences 
between the phenomenal and perceptual cases might explain why perceptual-
theoretical file-merging is possible even when phenomenal-material file-merging 
is not. I am more persuaded by the first suggestion than the second. Let me 
consider them in reverse order. 
Melnyk second suggestion is that there may be a barrier to file-merging in the 
phenomenal-material case that is absent in the perceptual-theoretical case. His 
suggestion relates specifically to phenomenal concepts that are only usable when 
you are actually having the states they refer to ('That is going on in me now') and 
which don't even involve the ability to re-identify those states as the same again. 
In such cases, Melnyk suggests, any temporary file associated with the 
phenomenal concept would simply be too transient to be merged with any 
permanent material concept file. I find this unpersuasive for three reasons. First, 
I find it doubtful that any genuine referring term should be so transient as to be 
unavailable for merging with others; what's the point of being able to acquire 
facts involving some entity if you can't slot them informatively into your overall 
picture of the world? Second, I doubt that any phenomenal concepts fit Melnyk's 
very simple model; to pick out some phenomenal states as 'that ' requires at 
least that you be able to attend to it, and it seems empirically likely that you can 
reidentify any experiences you can attend to. Third, I don't see why the kind of 
construction Melnyk has in mind should yield an asymmetry between phenomenal 
and perceptual concepts; any demonstrative analysis of phenomenal concepts 
would seem to have a natural parallel for perceptual concepts (thus, along with 
'that (experience)', we would have 'that (observable property)'). 
Melnyk's first suggestion does not try to drive a wedge between the phenomenal-
material and perceptual-theoretical cases; rather, he goes along with my 
assumption that the two cases stand or fall together, but argues that perceptual-
theoretical examples support the conclusion that file-merging is blocked in both 
cases. In the book I argued the other way, urging that file-merging is possible in 
both cases: thus I maintained that there is no barrier to merging a visual concept 
of a kestrel (such as might be derived from first-hand observation) with a 
theoretical concept of a kestrel (as might be derived from a textbook of 
evolutionary biology). Melnyk wonders whether the impression that such merging 
is possible might not derive from our tendency to slice off the secondary qualities 
from the visually-conceived kestrels, so to speak, thus making it easier to 
conflate them with the theoretically-conceived kestrels. But if this is what is going 
on, he points out, it provides no argument for the possibility of phenomenal-
material mergers. For we have made the perceptual-theoretical merger possible 
only by moving the hard parts—the secondary qualities—into the mind; so 
mergers which do involve these hard parts may well still be cognitively unviable. 
As I said, I find this line of argument relatively persuasive. There is a lot more to 
say about it, and in particular about the relationship between phenomenal and 
perceptual concepts. But rather than pursue this complex issue here, let me finish 
on an irenic note, by recalling the methodological point made earlier. 
Explanations of the intuition of distinctness need not be a yes-or-no matter. We 
do not need to choose between the antipathetic fallacy and the no-file-merging 
explanations. Perhaps one explanation works in some cases, and the other works 
in other cases. Or perhaps the two explanations sometimes complement each 
other: there may be people who wouldn't succumb to the antipathetic fallacy on 
its own, and who wouldn't be stopped from merging files solely by the cognitive 
divergence of phenomenal and material concepts, but who capitulate to the two 
influences acting in concert. 
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Notes
[Note 1] Kirk wonders how I would respond to David Chalmers' appeal to 'two-
dimensional semantics' to cast doubt on such materialist a posteriori necessary 
identities (Chalmers, 1996). I don't discuss 'two-dimensional semantics' explicitly 
in the book, but I think a clear enough answer is implicit there. Chalmers 
supposes that all terms have a 'primary intension', in addition to their referents 
as normally conceived. This 'primary intension' consists of those entities that the 
term would pick out in other possible worlds 'considered as actual' (for example, 
'water' would pick out XYZ if the actual world's watery stuff were XYZ rather than 
H2 O). Chalmers then assumes that, if the claim that a ≠ b is so much as 
conceivable (for example, water ≠ H2O ), this must be because 'a ''s and 'b ''s 
'primary intensions diverge' (there must be worlds in which the terms 'water' and 
'H2 O' would pick out different items), from which it follows that there is a 
genuinely possible world corresponding to the thought a ≠ b . Applying this to the 
mind-brain case, we then get the Kripkean thesis that, if it is so much as 
conceivable that pain ≠ M, where 'M' is some material concept, then there must 
be genuine possibilities where 'pain' and 'M' pick out different items. Moreover, if 
'pain' is a priori distinct from all material concepts, as the inflationist materialist 
assumes, then this must mean that 'pain' must refer by invoking some 
distinctively non-material entity. As an inflationist materialist, I respond to all this 
simply by denying Chalmers' crucial premise. I don't accept that, whenever some 
a ≠ b is conceivable, then 'a ' and 'b ' must have 'primary intensions' which 
diverge. The terms 'a ' and 'b ' may simply refer directly, which means they won't 
have any 'primary intensions' different from their normal referents (different from 
their 'secondary intensions'). We can still conceive a ≠ b without conceptual 
contradiction, simply because 'a ' and 'b ' are different terms which are not 
interchangeable in our cognitive economy. But it does not follow from this that 'a
' and 'b ' must have different 'primary intensions', that they must pick out their 
referents in ways that would give them different referents in other possible worlds 
'considered as actual'. 
